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This paper examines the impact of U.S. monetary policy shocks on the cross exchange 
rates of sterling, yen and mark. The main finding of the paper is a ‘delayed overshooting’ 
pattern for all currency cross rates examined (sterling/yen, yen/mark and mark/sterling) 
following an unexpected U.S. monetary policy change, which in turn generates excess 
returns. We also provide evidence that the ‘delayed overshooting’ pattern in cross 
exchange rates is accompanied by asymmetric interventions by central banks in the 
foreign exchange markets under consideration triggered by U.S. monetary policy shocks. 
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1. Introduction 
Following the classic Dornbusch (1976) ‘overshooting’ model on the impact of 
monetary policy on exchange rates and interest rates in the presence of price stickiness, a 
large empirical literature has focused on the assessment of these effects.
1 The standard 
theoretical framework predicts that a monetary tightening leads to an immediate 
exchange rate ‘overshooting’. Several empirical papers have focused on the impact of 
U.S. monetary policy on interest rates and exchange rates vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, and 
have established that the peak timing of this response occurs one to three years after 
rather than immediately (‘delayed overshooting’). This accumulated evidence creates in 
turn a ‘conditional forward premium puzzle’ with opportunities for excess returns by 
borrowing abroad and investing in the U.S.. Although the standard ‘forward premium 
puzzle’ is well documented in empirical studies of the foreign exchange market (Hodrick, 
1987; Froot and Thaler, 1990), the puzzle now arises conditional on an exogenous change 
in U.S. monetary policy. 
In particular, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) have shown that, in response to a tighter 
U.S. monetary policy, the dollar exhibits a ‘delayed overshooting’ behavior of 2 to 3 
years vis-à-vis the major currencies, a pattern that is confirmed by Clarida and Gali 
(1994). ‘Delayed overshooting’ is also assessed by Evans (1994), who uses weekly data 
and finds that the dollar overshoots with a delay of 2 to 3 years vis-à-vis the mark and the 
yen, and Lewis (1995), who finds that the dollar appreciates against the mark and the yen 
for the first 5 months after the monetary policy shock. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) 
offer also empirical evidence that after a contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock, 
domestic interest rates rise relative to foreign interest rates and the dollar appreciates. 
Kalyvitis and Michaelides (2001) adopt a specification with relative output and prices in 
order to capture the relative business cycle position of the United States and the domestic 
country; this approach solves the ‘delayed overshooting’ effect, but the authors report 
persistent deviations from the uncovered interest rate parity hypothesis.  
The ‘delayed overshooting’ and the ‘conditional forward premium puzzle’ are 
specific examples of how economies might be influenced by monetary policy abroad. 
However, the size of these impacts is likely to vary between countries due, for instance, 
                                                 
1 See Christiano et al. (1999) for an extensive survey of the relevant studies.   6
to discrepancies in the structural characteristics of the economy, differences in nominal 
rigidities and/or asymmetries in the monetary policy functions of foreign countries driven 
by differential responses to deviations of inflation or output from the respective targets. A 
challenging empirical issue is therefore the potential asymmetry of ‘delayed 
overshooting’ between cross exchange rates, i.e. whether the magnitude of, say, the dollar 
appreciation against major currencies following a U.S. monetary policy tightening differs. 
This question was originally posed by Frankel (1986), but has only recently received 
some attention in the study by Lobo et al. (2006) who examine the impact of changes in 
the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) target on daily dollar exchange rates and find that surprises 
associated with monetary contraction have a larger effect compared to monetary easing 
for the sterling, mark and Canadian dollar rates, whereas the opposite holds for the yen. 
In this vein and taking ‘delayed overshooting’ as a stylized fact, we first attempt to 
investigate how and to what extent cross exchange rates of major currencies (sterling, 
Japanese yen and German mark) respond to U.S. monetary policy shocks. We also assess 
the response of interest rate differentials between the three countries (UK, Japan, and 
Germany) and the existence of excess returns in these economies. To this end, we use the 
Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) approach that has been routinely used in the 
recent literature, in which we proxy U.S. monetary policy changes by the Romer and 
Romer (2004) narrative index (RR). This measure of U.S. monetary policy is better 
equipped to overcome the endogeneity and anticipatory biases that are inherent in other 
standard indices, like the FFR or the non-borrowed reserves ratio. 
We find a ‘delayed overshooting’ pattern for all the currency cross rates examined 
(sterling/yen, yen/mark and mark/sterling) when the Federal Reserve tightens U.S. 
monetary policy. Specifically, the mark appreciates with a delay relative to the yen with a 
peak at around ten months following the U.S. monetary policy shock, whereas the mark 
appreciates against the sterling and the sterling against the yen with a peak at around six 
months after the shock. We find that the responses of exchange rates and interest rates 
following the U.S. monetary policy tightening leave room for excess returns in the three 
foreign exchange markets under consideration.  
Next, we take our analysis one step further by attempting to explore whether the 
driving force of ‘delayed overshooting’ in the cross exchange rates has been asymmetric   7
foreign exchange interventions by central banks (that is, interventions following a 
specific foreign monetary policy shock, which differ in size and/or direction). Our 
investigation is motivated by several studies that have investigated the repercussions of 
foreign exchange intervention on the exchange rate following a monetary policy shock. 
Lewis (1995) has reported that central banks intervene to support a monetary policy that 
is consistent with their exchange rate targets, as monetary policy changes driven by 
domestic targets may trigger counter-movements in the exchange rate. Bonser-Neal et al. 
(1998) have claimed that interventions may at times react to past monetary policy actions, 
e.g. if U.S. monetary authorities wished to keep the exchange rate path within a particular 
zone. They find that various policies were evident at different periods, but also that the 
exchange rate responses to FFR changes are unaffected when one controls for central 
bank foreign exchange intervention. Kim (2003, 2005) has examined the joint effects of 
monetary policy and foreign exchange intervention on the U.S.-Canada exchange rate and 
has found evidence that ‘delayed overshooting’ can be explained by interventions in the 
foreign exchange market intended to weaken the exchange rate appreciation following a 
monetary policy tightening.  
Given these points, we use recently published foreign exchange intervention data to 
assess the potential impact of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange markets 
under consideration following a U.S. monetary policy shock. Our evidence shows that the 
‘delayed overshooting’ pattern in cross exchange rates is accompanied by significant 
asymmetric foreign exchange interventions. The evidence points towards a ‘leaning-in-
the-wind’ intervention policy by the Japanese monetary authorities, a finding that is in 
accordance with an effort to drive the yen to its new equilibrium against the dollar 
following a U.S. monetary policy shock. In contrast, we find evidence of a ‘leaning-
against-the-wind’ intervention by the German monetary authorities, which is consistent 
with a strengthening of the mark against the dollar following a U.S. monetary policy 
shock.  
The paper makes two contributions in the relevant literature. First, the ‘delayed 
overshooting’ pattern of cross exchange rates has, to our knowledge, been unnoticed in 
existing empirical studies on the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Given the 
robustness of our empirical results, this pattern is likely to have comprised a substantial   8
factor of exchange rate variability in the floating rate era. Second, the paper documents a 
source of exchange rate variability triggered by asymmetric central bank interventions, 
which offers a route for further explorations of the role of central banks in excess 
exchange rate movements, a role that is now conditional on an external monetary policy 
shock. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical 
methodology and the data utilised. Section 3 assesses the impact of the monetary policy 
shocks from two SVAR specifications and Section 4 explores the response of foreign 
exchange interventions. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Methodology and data 
2.1. Empirical specifications 
The empirical studies on ‘delayed overshooting’ are largely based on VAR models 
with U.S. monetary policy typically being identified by exogenous shocks in the FFR, the 
ratio of non-borrowed to total reserves or the target FFR. In their extensive study on the 
empirical effects of U.S. monetary policy on dollar exchange rates, Eichenbaum and 
Evans (1995) estimated VAR models for the U.S. and the other G-7 economies, including 
U.S. and foreign output, prices, interest rates, U.S. non-borrowed reserves, the FFR and 
the nominal U.S. dollar exchange rate vis-à-vis the foreign currencies, and assuming a 
recursive VAR structure in which the monetary policy shock is identified as an 
orthogonal innovation to the FFR or non-borrowed reserves.
2  
Subsequent empirical studies on the impact of monetary policy on asset prices have 
mostly involved VARs with identification imposed as restrictions mapping the reduced-
form shocks to structural shocks. Cushman and Zha (1997) constructed a two-country 
                                                 
2 Bonser-Neal et al. (1998) use the FFR target as a monetary policy indicator and find that the dollar 
overshoots immediately after the shock, thus exhibiting the classic Dornbusch (1976) ‘overshooting’ 
pattern. These authors claim that due to large deviations of the actual FFR (used in previous studies) from 
the FFR target, the latter should be considered as a better proxy for the true monetary policy measure. 
Bonser-Neal et al. (1998) also criticise the use of VARs for inaccurately measuring monetary policy effects 
due to problems related to the limitation of the information set. They claim that monetary policy may be 
inadequately represented when measured by shocks in the FFR within a VAR context; see also Rudebusch 
(1998). Another main category of U.S. monetary policy measures is known as the ‘narrative approach’ 
(Romer and Romer, 1989). Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) find that the ‘delayed overshooting’ pattern also 
arises when the dates identified by Romer and Romer (1989) are used to identify U.S. monetary policy 
contractions.   9
SVAR model assuming block exogeneity for the domestic variables of a small open 
economy (Canada) relative to the external (U.S.) variables. Their specification resolves 
some standard empirical puzzles, like the domestic currency depreciation following a 
domestic contractionary monetary policy and the ‘price puzzle’, but the authors find 
short-run deviations from uncovered interest rate parity. Kim and Roubini (2000) have 
used a non-recursive VAR that allows monetary policy to respond contemporaneously to 
exchange rate shocks and resolved partially the ‘delayed overshooting’ effect and the 
‘conditional forward premium puzzle’. Furthermore, the authors provide evidence that, in 
response to an unexpected increase in the U.S. monetary policy rate, the short-term 
interest rates of non-U.S. G7 countries increase and their currencies relative to the dollar 
depreciate on impact. Faust and Rogers (2003) have assessed the robustness of 
conclusions drawn from SVAR models relative to changes in the identifying assumptions 
and find that the ‘delayed overshooting’ result is sensitive to the assumptions adopted. In 
contrast, they provide evidence that deviations from uncovered interest rate parity are 
robust to various assumptions and, moreover, that the estimates of the share of exchange 
rate variance due to monetary policy shocks can take quite large values.  
Given these considerations, our identification of U.S. monetary policy is based on a 
number of standard structural assumptions. Our general empirical strategy is to develop a 
two-economy setup and include an external economy (U.S.) that is assumed to be large 
and relatively closed. Thus we assume that a U.S. monetary policy shock reflects an 
exogenous shock for other economies, which in turn respond to domestic and external 
developments. The country pairs considered are UK-Japan, Japan-Germany and 
Germany-UK, a choice that is mainly dictated by the high economic integration among 
these economies and the almost perfect substitutability of their assets in international 
financial markets. 
Our first SVAR specification reports the effects of a shock in the monetary policy of a 
large foreign economy on the interest rates of country pairs and their corresponding cross 
exchange rates (Model I). This specification is broadly based on the identification scheme 
proposed by Kim and Roubini (2000) and is modified to account for the responses of two 
countries’ variables to an exogenous shock in the monetary policy of the foreign 
economy. In particular, we assume that the structural shocks, e(t), are related to the   10
reduced form residuals, u(t), by e(t)=G0 u (t) with the contemporaneous coefficient 
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The vector of variables for countries 1 and 2 consists of the log of output (IP1 and 
IP2), the log of the price index (P1 and P2), the log of a narrow monetary aggregate (M1 
and M 2), the central bank interest rate (IR1 and IR  2), the log of the nominal cross 
exchange rate expressed in units of the currency of country 1 in terms of the currency of 
country 2 (XR1/2), the log of the world commodity price index (PW). Finally, the U.S. 
monetary policy indicator  (RR)  is given by Romer and Romer (2004); see the next 
subsection for more details on the RR indicator. 
The equations of the model are divided into three blocks that broadly follow Gordon 
and Leeper (1994), Kim (1999), and Kim and Roubini (2000). The first block with four 
equations represents the goods markets in countries 1 and 2 under the plausible 
assumptions that real activity does not respond contemporaneously to the price level, the 
monetary aggregate, the interest rate and the exchange rate of the domestic economy. 
Thus, firms cannot adjust their output contemporaneously due to inertia and other 
adjustment costs, although unexpected changes in prices or financial variables affect real 
activity in the long run. We also assume that there are no contemporaneous mutual effects 
between the real sectors of the two countries and that both output and prices do not 
respond contemporaneously to innovations in the RR indicator, which are sensible 
assumptions given our monthly data frequency.  
The second block describes the demand and supply of money. Specifically, the 5th   11
and 6th equations represent the money demand equations for the two countries where the 
standard approach with the demand for real money balances depending on real income 
and the opportunity cost of holding money is adopted. Next, the 7th and 8th equations 
describe the monetary policy rule with the discount rate set by the central bank after 
observing the current domestic monetary aggregate and the exchange rate vis-à-vis the 
other foreign country (cross exchange rate). Jang and Ogaki (2004) have shown that 
results from VARs on the effects of U.S. monetary policy on exchange rates are sensitive 
to this assumption, which is consistent with central bank policy.
3 Notice that the central 
bank does not react to shifts in the current values of the monetary aggregate of the foreign 
economy and to the domestic and foreign output and price levels, due to information 
delays in data availability. Also, as in Kim and Roubini (2000) the domestic interest rate 
is restricted from responding contemporaneously to unexpected shifts in the external 
(U.S.) monetary policy shocks.  
Finally, in the third block of the system the 9th equation is an arbitrage condition 
where we assume that the cross exchange rate is contemporaneously affected by all 
previous variables. The world commodity price index is exogenous to any domestic 
variable. Last, we treat the RR index as not responding to the foreign countries’ variables, 
although we allow for contemporaneous response to the world commodity price index. 
This reflects the widespread view that the Federal Reserve has conducted monetary 
policy acting as the leader in international interest rate movements and has been less 
concerned with external factors than other central banks.
4  
                                                 
3 Although central banks typically do not admit targets for the exchange rate, they definitely pay attention 
to exchange rate developments. For example, the Bank of England’s Inflation Report reviews explicitly 
how the current level of the sterling and its forecasted path will impact the inflation forecast and, in turn, 
monetary policy. Also, both the Bank of Japan and the Bundesbank were concerned with the exchange rate. 
See McKinnon (1995) for a relevant point on the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy reaction. The 
Bundesbank’s Monthly Reports mentioned frequently how fluctuations in the mark exchange rate would be 
mirrored into monetary policy, as a weak (strong) mark indicated possible inflationary pressures (demand 
contraction); see also Clarida (2001). Evidence from VARs reported by Clarida and Gertler (1997) showed 
that the day-to-day money rate, the instrument of Bundesbank monetary policy, indeed responded to the 
mark in the way described above. 
4 Notice that the Federal Reserve's policy decisions are usually based on permanent changes rather than 
short-term developments in foreign capital markets. This may explain, to some extent, the neglect of 
contemporaneous shocks in foreign interest rates in their monetary policy stance. The Federal Reserve has 
traditionally been concerned with U.S. developments (as prescribed in the 1977 amendment to the Federal 
Reserve Act) and has rarely made policy decisions based on international considerations, perhaps with the 
exception of some contractions during steep dollar changes (see also Cooper and Little, 2001). Along this 
reasoning, the output, prices and monetary aggregates of the large, external economy (U.S.) are not   12
The previous specification entails a detailed framework for investigating the impact 
of external monetary policy shocks on individual country’s variables, but we are also 
interested in examining the impact on the relative position of the two countries. In 
general, two-country open economy models suggest that the relative position of a country 
is crucial for exchange rate determination; see, for instance, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). 
For this reason, we follow the approach by Kalyvitis and Michaelides (2001) and use a 
model specified in relative terms (Model II), which has been shown to eliminate ‘delayed 
overshooting’ in the assessment of the effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks when a 
recursive error structure is adopted. Relative output captures the relative business cycle 
position of the two countries; the variable can be an important determinant of short-run 
exchange rate movements either through a relative productivity channel or by generating 
expectations of tighter monetary policy (and thus a stronger currency) in the faster 
growing economy. Relative price differentials are then used to capture the long-run 
exchange rate adjustment based on purchasing power parity. In turn, the relative money 
supply and the interest rate differential between the two countries are included in the 
money market block. Furthermore, this approach requires the estimation of fewer 
parameters, increasing hence the degrees of freedom, and allows us to assess the 
robustness of our results based on the previous specification.  
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Here IP1/2, P1/2, and M1/2, denote the log of the ratio of industrial production, price 
level and monetary aggregate in country 1 relative to country 2, (IR1-IR2) denotes the 
central bank interest rate differential, whereas the interpretation of the previous 
                                                                                                                                                   
included here for two reasons. First, these effects are already incorporated in the RR index and, second, we 
focus on the effects on cross exchange rates and not on the exchange rates vis-à-vis the dollar.   13
specification is carried over in a straightforward manner. 
 
2.2. Data and estimation 
To identify U.S. monetary policy shocks we use the (cumulated) indicator proposed 
by Romer and Romer (2004), who have further developed the narrative approach 
introduced by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and formalised by Romer and Romer 
(1989). In Romer and Romer (2004) a series of intended FFR around the meetings of the 
Federal Open Market Committee is first derived. To account for endogenous interest rate 
changes linked to economic conditions, the series is regressed upon the Federal Reserve’s 
internal forecasts of inflation and real activity with the residuals representing changes in 
intended funds rate that are orthogonal to information on future economic conditions. 
Romer and Romer (2004) find that the policy effects are substantially stronger and 
quicker using this indicator relative to other conventional U.S. monetary policy measures, 
like innovations in the FFR or the non-borrowed reserves. However, to assess the 
robustness of our results to the adoption of the RR index we shall also use alternatively 
the FFR and the indicator proposed by Bernanke and Mihov (1998); see subsection 3.2 
for more details. 
To estimate the SVAR models outlined above the following variables were used. 
Output (IP) is measured by the industrial production index, the price level (P) by the 
consumer price index, and money (M) by the monetary aggregate M1, with the exception 
of the UK for which M0 is used (all series are seasonally adjusted). We also used the key 
central bank interest rate (IR), the nominal cross exchange rate (XR1/2) expressed in units 
of the currency of country 1 for a unit of the currency of country 2, the World All 
Commodities Prices index (PW), and the RR index. All data are taken from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics with the exception of the Romer and Romer (2004) U.S. 
monetary policy index, which is provided by the authors. The dataset used to estimate the 
model consists of monthly observations covering the period 1980:01-1996:12 and the 
reduced-form specifications are estimated with 6 lags and a constant unless otherwise 
noted.
5 
                                                 
5 The choice of the starting period was based on the point raised by Clarida et al. (1998) that during 1979 
there were large regime shifts in the conduct of monetary policy by the major central banks, as the control   14
 
3. The effects of monetary policy shocks on cross exchange rates 
In this Section we first assess the effects of a U.S. monetary policy shock on the 
cross exchange rates and the interest rates for the three economies considered (UK, Japan 
and Germany) in the context of Model I and Model II developed in the previous Section. 
We then assess the robustness of our results to the utilization of alternative U.S. monetary 
policy measures. 
 
3.1. Impulse responses to a shock in the RR index  
Figure 1 displays the impulse responses of the exchange rate and interest rates for the 
UK-Japan, Japan-Germany and Germany-UK pairs following a contractionary U.S. 
monetary policy shock (illustrated as a positive one standard deviation of the RR index) 
for both Models I and II. Solid lines are the point estimates, and dotted lines represent 
one-standard-error bands for a 48-month period derived from 8000 draws by Monte Carlo 
integration following Sims and Zha (1999). The results for output, prices and monetary 
aggregates (not reported here) show that tightening U.S. monetary policy affects foreign 
output for a period lasting up to one year; however, this effect evaporates when relative 
industrial production is considered. The response of the price level is insignificant for all 
the pairs of countries indicating the absence of any ‘price puzzle’ effects, with the sole 
exception of the relative price level for Japan-Germany under Model II that becomes 
negative in the short run. The monetary aggregates increase significantly for Japan and 
Germany, but are found to diminish in the case of the UK following the U.S. monetary 
policy tightening. 
Turning to the variables of interest, we observe that after a RR contractionary shock 
the central bank interest rates in the UK and Germany remain virtually unaffected (see 
first rows in Figure 1). However, the Japanese interest rate rises immediately and 
persistently. The findings from the impulse responses of the central bank interest rates are 
also confirmed by Model II, in which the Japan-Germany interest rate spread widens (see 
first row of lower part of Figure 1). In addition, all cross exchange rates under both 
                                                                                                                                                   
of inflation became their primary objective. The availability of the RR monetary policy measure as 
provided by Romer and Romer (2004) determined the ending period of our sample.   15
models exhibit a ‘delayed overshooting’ pattern. Specifically, the mark appreciates with a 
delay relative to the yen with a peak at around ten months following the U.S. monetary 
policy shock, whereas the ‘delayed overshooting’ pattern for the sterling/yen and the 
mark/sterling is somewhat shorter. The mark appreciates against sterling and sterling 
against the yen with a peak at around six months after the shock; this behavior is in line 
with the appreciation of the mark against the yen.  
The overall picture suggests that there may be room for excess returns in the pairs of 
countries considered; to investigate this hypothesis we estimate the effects of a monetary 
policy shock on ex-post excess returns on the basis of our estimated SVAR.
6 The results 
are presented in Figure 2, which shows the point estimates and the one-standard-error 
bands of the impulse responses for a 48-month period following a tightening monetary 
policy shock in the RR indicator. We find that the hypothesis of no excess returns can be 
rejected in all cases at around four-to-six months following the U.S. monetary policy 
shock, pointing towards a short-lived violation of uncovered interest rate parity.  
We next assess the extent to which U.S. monetary policy shocks have been a 
prominent source of exchange rate fluctuations during the period under consideration. By 
examining this issue, it may be possible to shed some light on the causes of exchange rate 
volatility, which often occurs despite the apparent stability in the domestic 
macroeconomic environment. In the same vein, external monetary policy shocks might 
provide -at least partially- an explanation for the periodic turbulence that had been 
observed e.g. in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System 
(EMS). 
The upper part of Table 1 summarises the percentage of the n-step ahead forecast 
errors in the central bank interest rates and the cross exchange rates that is attributable to 
innovations in U.S. monetary policy based on Model I. The lower part of Table 1 displays 
the corresponding picture for the interest rate spreads and the cross exchange rates based 
on Model II. As can be readily seen, a non-negligible part of the cross exchange rates 
variation for all pairs of countries can be attributed to the U.S. monetary policy shock. 
This effect exceeds 10% of total variation for the cross exchange rates under 
                                                 
6 The impulse responses of excess returns are related to the impulse responses of the interest rates and the 
cross exchange rate as follows: 
2 / 1 2 / 1
1 1 2
2 / 1
t t XR XR IR IR ER − + − = + .    16
consideration at a one-to-three-year horizon, reaching 22% for the yen/mark rate in the 
second year after the shock. To convey a sense of the uncertainty associated with these 
point estimates, the standard errors are also reported. Although the confidence intervals 
are wide, we find that U.S. monetary policy shocks are significant for the variation of 
cross exchange rates, particularly for the yen/mark. A smaller but non-negligible part of 
the variation in interest rates and interest rate spreads is also attributable to the RR shock 
under both models, especially at a longer horizon. 
To sum up, our evidence points towards a strong response of the interest rate in Japan 
following a contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock. At the same time, we observe a 
‘delayed overshooting’ pattern in the cross exchange rates between the currencies of UK, 
Japan and Germany, indicating the substantial impact of the U.S. monetary policy shocks 
on the foreign currencies. 
 
3.2. Sensitivity tests 
In this subsection we present some additional sensitivity tests on the empirical impact 
of U.S. monetary policy on foreign interest rates and cross exchange rates. We use two 
alternative measures of U.S. monetary policy in our SVAR specifications to assess the 
robustness of our findings. The first measure is the FFR that has been proposed by 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and has been routinely utilised by the majority of studies 
attempting to assess empirically the impact of U.S. monetary policy. The second 
measure, also used by Kalyvitis and Michaelides (2001), is the Bernanke and Mihov 
(1998) indicator (BM) that is based on a model of commercial bank reserves and Federal 
Reserve operating procedures and has the ability of reflecting both interest rate and 
reserves targeting. According to Bernanke and Mihov (1998) the Federal Reserve has 
exercised both types of monetary policy: non-borrowed reserves targeting in the period 
from late 1979 to late 1982, and FFR targeting from 1983 onwards. Therefore, the BM 
indicator provides an overall measure of monetary policy stance. We thus estimate the 
impulse responses of our models by using alternatively these two measures of U.S. 
monetary policy in the place of the RR indicator. The results are presented in Figure 3 and 
4, which correspond to the FFR and the BM indicator respectively. In order to facilitate 
comparisons we present the results by country pairs.   17
For the UK-Japan pair, the response of the sterling/yen cross rate to FFR innovation 
is a statistically significant appreciation of the sterling against the yen, which is similar to 
the response following the shock in the RR index. However, the sterling/yen cross rate 
remains virtually unaffected following a shock in the BM indicator. Under Model I, both 
central bank interest rates exhibit an immediate and significant rise after a U.S. monetary 
policy shock when the FFR and BM indicators are used (see the first column in upper part 
of Figures 3 and 4); moreover, the response of the central bank interest rate spread shows 
an increase under Model II (see the first column in lower part of Figure 3 and 4). 
Regarding the presence of excess returns, under both U.S. monetary policy measures 
(FFR and BM) the hypothesis of no excess returns can be rejected for the fourth period 
under Model I and for a larger period lasting up to one year under Model II (see the first 
column in Figures 3 and 4).  
Turning to the Japan-Germany pair, under both models the impulse responses to 
innovations in the FFR are close to the responses to the RR indicator with similar short-
term excess returns generated immediately after the FFR shock (see the second column of 
Figure 3). Notice that the impulse responses following the shock to the BM index differ 
from those generated when the RR index is used. In particular, the yen rate shows a 
significant appreciation relative to the mark on impact, while there is no evidence of 
excess returns (see the second column of Figure 4).  
As regards the Germany-UK pair, the impulse responses of all variables following the 
FFR and BM innovations are similar to those obtained by the RR indicator, with the 
exception of the mark/sterling rate whose response is found to be statistically 
insignificant under Model II. Again, there is evidence of excess returns for the second 
quarter under Model I and for the fourth period under Model II following a monetary 
policy shock to either the FFR or the BM indicator (see the third column of Figures 3 and 
4). 
Finally, another robustness test involves the use of the real exchange rate instead of 
the nominal rate. Given short-run price rigidities, we are interested in testing whether 
monetary policy shocks translate into real exchange movements as well. Hence, this 
modification allows us to investigate the impact of U.S. monetary policy shocks on the 
relative competitiveness of other countries and, moreover, facilitates comparisons with   18
earlier studies (like, for instance, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995). The results, which are 
not reported here for reasons of space, verify our earlier findings that sterling appreciates 
significantly against the yen, and the mark against both the yen and sterling. The rise in 
the interest rate in Japan remains statistically significant and we find again short-lived 
excess returns in all cases under both models that are close to those reported earlier on.
7 
 
4. Interpreting the evidence: A foreign exchange intervention approach 
Given our empirical findings so far, which have established the ‘delayed 
overshooting’ effect for the pairs of countries under consideration, in this Section we 
attempt to interpret the reaction of cross exchange rates after the U.S. monetary policy 
shock by investigating the role of foreign exchange intervention. The two major theories 
on the impact of interventions on the exchange rate are the portfolio balance channel and 
the signalling channel. The portfolio balance theory recognizes that sterilized intervention 
changes the relative supplies of bonds denominated in different currencies, which in turn 
affects the expected returns due to the change in either the price of the bonds or the 
exchange rate. The signalling channel, in constrast, suggests that official intervention 
conveys information about future monetary policy or the long-run equilibrium value of 
the exchange rate.
  
In turn, foreign exchange interventions can be broadly classified into two types 
according to their targets: i) as ‘leaning-against-the-wind’ policies, under which the 
authorities aim at mitigating the dominant trend in the exchange rate (for example selling 
a currency when it is appreciating) and ii) as ‘leaning-in-the-wind’, when the authorities 
seek to hasten the exchange rate trend in the expected direction (like accelerating the 
depreciation of a currency to the desired level).
8 
We emphasize that our investigation does not aim at discriminating between 
                                                 
7 Given the data availability for the FFR, we have also investigated the impulse responses for the period 
1980:01–2004:12 for all country pairs, but the findings were similar under the two sample periods. 
8 Following the Plaza Agreement (September 1985) and the Louvre Accord (February 1987) according to 
which central banks conducted concerted foreign exchange transactions aiming at mitigating the 
overvaluation of the U.S. dollar, and, generally, stabilising exchange rates by means of interventions, 
several authors have investigated the conduct of foreign exchange market intervention and its impact on the 
exchange rate. See, among others, Schwartz (2000), Sarno and Taylor (2001), Dominguez (2003) and 
Neely (2005) for detailed surveys on interventions in the foreign exchange market and the related 
theoretical and empirical literature.   19
alternative intervention theories, but rather at identifying the potential impact and 
direction of foreign exchange intervention following a foreign monetary policy shock in 
conjunction with our previous finding of ‘delayed overshooting’ in cross exchange rates. 
Given this purpose, we follow Kim (2003, 2005) in our empirical setup in order to 
investigate the extent to which foreign exchange intervention can be a source of 
asymmetric exchange rate responses to a U.S. monetary policy shock.  
To this end, we extend our empirical specifications to account for the impact of 
foreign exchange intervention. Notice that some studies have attempted to identify 
foreign exchange intervention by changes in central bank reserves. This approach, 
however, has been criticized because reserves may fluctuate excessively due to changes 
in valuation or interest receipts. In addition, they do not include intervention operations 
like hidden reserves, which involve changes in official deposits of foreign currency with 
domestic currency and are regularly used by many central banks.
9 Taking these 
considerations into account, the dataset we use in our study covers reported interventions 
(in millions of domestic currency) in dollars and marks by the Bank of Japan during the 
period 1991-1996, in dollars by the Bundesbank during the period 1979-1995 when 
interventions ceased, and interventions in dollars and marks by the Bank of England 
during the period 1988-1993 when interventions ceased.
10 We then define foreign 
exchange interventions by each central bank as the ratio of net transactions (purchases or 
sales) of the three foreign currencies under consideration during the corresponding month 
over the domestic monetary base defined as money in circulation and credit institutions’ 
current accounts for Japan and Germany, and money in circulation (M0) for the UK. 
After including the foreign exchange interventions in the specification with the 
country-specific economic variables (Model III) the contemporaneous coefficient matrix 
(G0) becomes: 
                                                 
9 See Sarno and Taylor (2001) for a more extensive discussion. 
10 With the exception of intervention by the Federal Reserve, intervention data for the large economies have 
only recently been disclosed publicly. The Japanese Ministry of Finance in August 2000 started to publish 
daily intervention data, and in July 2001 it released historical data starting from April 1991. The Bank of 
England also started to publish intervention data in 2000, while the Bundesbank has not released publicly 
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We assume that the foreign exchange intervention variables, termed FEI1 and FEI2 
respectively, react contemporaneously to the exchange rate, while the central bank 
interest rate is set contemporaneously in reaction to domestic monetary aggregate and 
exchange rate changes as in the original specification. Furthermore, we allow 
contemporaneous interactions between the two policies. The rest of the variables are 
structured as before, whereas analogous adjustments are made in the specification with 
the relative variables (Model IV).
11 Figure 5 depicts the impulse responses of the foreign 
exchange interventions and the cross exchange rates for an 18-month period following a 
RR monetary policy shock. 
For the UK-Japan pair of countries (see the first column in Figure 5), intervention 
rises only for the Bank of Japan, whereas the intervention by the Bank of England 
remains unaffected. Interestingly, the ‘delayed overshooting’ pattern for the sterling/yen 
exchange rate is now insignificant. The second column in Figure 5, which plots the 
corresponding figures for the Japan-Germany pair, confirms this pattern. Again, the rise 
in intervention by the Bank of Japan triggers dollar purchases in both models. These 
interventions are now accompanied by dollar purchases by the Bundesbank, which are 
however only marginally significant in Model IV. Again, the ‘delayed overshooting’ 
                                                 
11 We also include a dummy to capture the large interventions that preceded the September 1992 crisis. The 
results are not sensitive to the inclusion of this dummy. Given the data availability, our sample spans over 
the period 1991:01-1996:12, except for the Germany-UK pair where it covers 1988:01-1996:12, and the 
models are estimated with two lags.   21
pattern in the yen-mark cross rate is virtually eliminated. These findings are in 
accordance with a ‘leaning-in-the-wind’ intervention by the Japanese monetary 
authorities that expect the yen to depreciate against the dollar following the U.S. 
monetary policy contraction, and decide to buy dollars in an attempt to stabilise the 
domestic currency at a higher level. The evidence presented here seems therefore to 
support the view that, conditional on a U.S. monetary policy shock, the Japanese 
monetary authorities have attempted to drive the yen to its new equilibrium against the 
dollar.
12 
The picture is somewhat different when we turn to the Germany-UK pair (see the 
third column in Figure 5). The response of the Bundesbank is to sell dollars following the 
U.S. monetary contraction. This can be interpreted as a ‘leaning-against-the-wind’ 
intervention by the German monetary authorities, which aim at strengthening the mark 
against the dollar.
13 Following the ‘leaning-against-the-wind’ intervention in support of 
the mark and the lack of intervention by the Bank of England, the mark appreciates with a 
delay against sterling after the U.S. monetary policy tightening. The evidence is 
consistent with the low inflation target implemented by the Bundesbank and its leading 
role in the EMS with monetary authorities in Germany intervening in the foreign 
exchange market after an unexpected U.S. monetary tightening to prevent the 
depreciation of the mark vis-à-vis the dollar that would have affected the stability of the 
EMS, which in turn generated a strong response in the mark/sterling exchange rate. 
We close this Section by stressing that even though asymmetric short-lived foreign 
exchange interventions appear to be a potential mechanism generating prolonged 
‘delayed overshooting’ in currency crosses following an external monetary policy shock, 
an in-depth treatment of this causal channel is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
Given the short data span, we view our results on the response of foreign exchange 
interventions as a first step towards understanding the repercussions for excess exchange 
rate fluctuations triggered by foreign monetary policy innovations. A more extensive 
                                                 
12 Recently published data show that the Bank of Japan intervened in the 1990s to affect the yen/dollar rate 
in a stabilising manner by selling (buying) dollars and buying (selling) yen when the parity was above 
(below) a target level of 125 yen/dollar (Ito, 2003, 2007; Frenkel et al., 2005). 
13 Weber (1996) claims that after 1985 the Bundesbank conducted interventions jointly with the Federal 
Reserve aiming at countering the trend of the dollar. See Fatum and Hutchison (2003) for a detailed 
description of the concerted intervention by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve between 1985 and 
1995 that targeted at the dollar/mark rate.   22
investigation regarding the relationship of the response of foreign exchange interventions 
in conjunction with cross exchange rate responses, possibly by using intervention data 
covering larger periods as well as higher frequency exchange rate data, seems therefore 
warranted. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper has investigated the effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks on foreign 
interest rates and cross exchange rates. Building upon the spirit of Eichenbaum and Evans 
(1995) and using a SVAR approach, we first attempted to assess the impact of 
unanticipated U.S. monetary policy on foreign interest rates and cross exchange rates in 
the UK, Japan and Germany. We provided evidence in support of ‘delayed overshooting’ 
in all the currency crosses examined (sterling/yen, yen/mark and mark/sterling) 
accompanied by excess returns in the foreign exchange markets considered, whereas a 
non-negligible portion of exchange rate variability between the currency crosses can be 
attributed to the U.S. monetary policy shock. We then investigated the possibility that 
‘delayed overshooting’ in cross exchange rates is triggered by central bank interventions 
in the corresponding foreign exchange market following the U.S. monetary policy shock. 
Our evidence indicated the presence of asymmetric foreign exchange interventions, 
which are likely to have generated ‘delayed overshooting’ effects in the cross exchange 
rates examined. Thus, our paper stresses another aspect of asymmetry in central bank 
behaviour during the floating exchange rate era, namely the possibility that exchange rate 
fluctuations were generated by foreign exchange interventions following external 
monetary policy disturbances. 
We close the paper by noting that here we focused on the international effects of 
monetary policy that mainly arise through the exchange rate channel and work through 
the uncovered interest rate parity condition. These effects may be exacerbated by the 
presence of asymmetries in the monetary policy functions of foreign countries, like 
differential responses to deviations of inflation or output from the respective targets. To 
sharpen our understanding of the implications generated by the conduct of foreign 
monetary policy we delegate a more in-depth analysis of the structural characteristics of 
domestic monetary policy responses following external shocks to future research.   23
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TABLE 1. Variance decomposition of interest rates and cross exchange rates (RR indicator) 
 
Model I 
  UK - Japan  Japan - Germany  Germany - UK 
Period  UK rate  Japan rate  sterling/yen  Japan rate German rate yen/mark German rate  UK rate  mark/sterling













































































































  UK - Japan  Japan - Germany  Germany - UK 
Period  Interest rate spread  sterling/yen   Interest rate spread  yen/ mark  Interest rate spread  mark /sterling 
1-3  0.4272 0.7247  1.6767  0.8147  0.4490  0.7490 
  (0.548) (0.940)  (1.390)  (1.003)  (0.548)  (0.984) 
4-6  1.4407 1.6917  4.7163  2.1937  1.7047  2.2043 
  (1.523) (1.799)  (3.603)  (1.858)  (2.008)  (2.091) 
7-12  3.1470 5.8505  5.3642  6.9045  3.0583  9.0855 
  (3.104) (4.440)  (4.835)  (4.770)  (3.306)  (6.0655) 
13-24  5.8043 10.9274  8.5613  12.2148  5.0140  13.8310 
  (5.218) (8.276)  (7.416)  (8.714)  (4.702)  (9.022) 
25-36  10.3633 13.2352  9.7298  12.5364  6.7160  14.8378 
  (8.212) (10.108)  (7.940)  (8.808)  (6.128)  (10.0591) 
37-48  12.7359 14.1970  9.9587  12.3477  7.6191  14.5407 
  (9.636) (10.411)  (7.268)  (8.410)  (6.660)  (9.798) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.   27
FIGURE 1. Impulse responses of interest rates and cross exchange rates  
to a U.S. monetary policy shock (RR indicator) 
 






Notes: The labels next to the variables refer to the countries presented above the graphs. The 
exchange rates considered (PY, YM and MP) are sterling/yen, yen/mark and mark/sterling 
respectively. 
 











































































































FIGURE 2. Impulse responses of excess returns  
to a U.S. monetary policy shock (RR indicator) 
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FIGURE 3. Impulse responses to a U.S. monetary policy shock (FFR indicator)  
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FIGURE 4. Impulse responses to a U.S. monetary policy shock (BM indicator)  
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FIGURE 5. Impulse responses of foreign exchange interventions and cross exchange rates  
to a U.S. monetary policy shock (RR indicator) 
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